

VZCZCXRO4716
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHAK #6164/01 3040621
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 310621Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9693
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0790
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 1545
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 006164

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

TREASURY FOR OTI - JSERAFINI AND RLOEFFLER
JUSTICE FOR AMLS AND OPDAT/ALEXANDER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2011

TAGS: [PTER](#) [KTFN](#) [TU](#)

SUBJECT: S/CT URBANCIC TRIP TO EUROPE AND TURKEY

REF: A. A) STATE 179961

[1](#)B. B) ANKARA 5124

[1](#)C. C) STATE 35685

[1](#)D. D) ANKARA 1152

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

[1](#)1. (C) Summary and Introduction: We are delighted that Deputy Counterterrorism Coordinator Urbancic will lead an interagency team to key western European capitals and Ankara.

As an important part of the larger effort against PKK terrorism, this trip holds the potential to move trilateral (Europe-U.S.-Turkey) cooperation against PKK networks in Europe to a new level that should result in substantial disruptions in PKK support networks. To that end, we hope a key outcome of the stops in Europe will be agreement to establish trilateral law enforcement/intelligence working groups that will oversee targeted operations against specific PKK operatives and financiers resulting in arrests, convictions and extraditions. Here in Ankara, Urbancic can both report on his western European meetings and once again urge GOT officials to focus on helping Europeans develop judicially admissible evidence on crimes committed in Europe.
End Summary.

Overall Objective: Disrupt PKK Networks

[1](#)2. (C) The overall objective of the U.S. effort to enhance cooperation with Turkey against the PKK in Europe is to disrupt as much as possible the PKK's extensive financing and propaganda network in western Europe -- in effect its vital support lifeline. The PKK has been effective in its double game of posing (through the use of aliases and front groups) as a political or national liberation movement in western Europe while conducting terrorist attacks in Turkey, attacks which have resulted in 600 deaths in Turkey in 2006 alone. The TAK, which is the PKK under another name, has been attacking tourist areas in western Turkey, ratcheting up the threat to the international community and to Turkey's economy.

[1](#)3. (C) European Governments, with the notable exception of Germany and, more recently, the UK, remain half-hearted in their cooperation with Turkey against PKK. The Turks tell us that, despite the EU Clearinghouse designation of PKK and KGK as a terrorist group, only in Germany is PKK membership a

crime. For their part, Turkish efforts have tended to focus on extradition requests for prosecutions in Turkey. These are often denied by western European courts or governments either on evidentiary grounds or because they have human rights concerns about Turkish courts or prisons. While we need to keep working to strengthen the extradition channel, we need to constantly reiterate to both Europeans and Turks the need to pursue other channels that are more likely to be effective in disrupting PKK support operations that also undermine the rule of law in European countries.

¶4. (C) This means developing sufficient evidence to arrest or prosecute PKK officials locally for crimes they are committing in Europe, such as narcotics trafficking, extortion, human trafficking, money-laundering. Such crimes, which undermine basic public order in Europe, could be easier to pursue than prosecutions for membership in a foreign terrorist organization. Another channel that could disrupt PKK financial flows would be asset freezes based on the EU Clearinghouse designation. Asset freezes would have the advantage of not requiring the same evidentiary standard as prosecutions. Despite our suggestions, to our knowledge the Turkish Financial Intelligence Unit has not pursued FIU mechanisms, such as information requests through the Egmont Group, to garner more information about known front groups, bank accounts or PKK individuals.

How to Get There

¶5. (C) We are delighted at the delegation's focus (ref a) on developing an agreed set of measures to achieve concrete successes against criminal activities in Europe. We began

ANKARA 00006164 002 OF 003

this effort in 2005 with a focus on two PKK operatives in France and Germany. Though there have been an increased number of PKK arrests, especially in Germany, we failed to make further progress on the two names we targeted, suggesting the need for deeper cooperation and information-sharing, both between countries and among agencies within a single country. Prosecutions or asset freezes will only happen if cooperation is intensified, with Turks, Americans and individual European governments establishing a painstaking, long-term information-sharing mechanism in each country. The mechanism, a trilateral working group or task force, would need to have law enforcement and intelligence agencies in the lead, going over case files to identify leads and pinpoint collection targets. Ideally, an action plan could be developed in each country.

¶6. (C) In addition to arresting individuals for specific criminal acts within countries -- like drug trafficking -- it is important to have the participation of judicial/prosecutorial elements responsible for terrorism issues. This could help address issues surrounding criminalization and prosecution of PKK membership. By having Ministry of Justice officials, prosecutors or magistrates present, the delegation can better deal with law enforcement agencies' claims that their hands are tied. Inclusion of judicial officials will also facilitate the Ankara RLA making contacts for future engagement.

Germany

¶7. (C) We understand that Turkish and German law enforcement agencies already have close cooperation on PKK issues but the Germans might help with other EU countries by explaining their own view of the PKK as a criminal and terrorist organization in Germany. As the Sakine Cansiz case showed, even this good cooperation would seem to benefit from a more active approach to targeting. Given Schengen countries' relatively open borders, the German Embassy here

tells us German law enforcement is frustrated about the PKK networks ease of movement between Germany and Belgium and the Netherlands, in particular.

United Kingdom

¶18. (C) We understand both from the UK Embassy here and the Turkish MFA that the two countries have increased cooperation against the PKK as part of a broader framework of cooperation against terrorism and crime, through a mechanism called the "Bosphorus Group." The UK has recently eliminated an irritant between the two countries by "proscribing" the KGK. As in Germany, the UK could be more active in pressing other European governments to take the PKK seriously. The UK DCM here has suggested the PKK issue could be usefully raised with the following UK officials: David Richmond, Foreign Office; Andy Haymond, Home Office; Brian Minahame, Serious Organized Crime Agency; and William Nye, Home Office Counter-terrorism unit.

Benelux

¶19. (C) Belgium and the Netherlands repeatedly come up when Turkish MFA officials talk about their frustrations over the lack of cooperation against the PKK. Belgium allows PKK front groups to operate freely and several senior PKK operatives are based in Belgium. When the Swiss authorities caught and released high-level PKKer Remzi Kartal recently, they did so based on his refugee status in Belgium. Turkish officials hope the Belgians' new terrorism law and their embarrassment over their handling of the Fehriye Erdal case may mean they will be more open than in the past to an anti-PKK message. Likewise, in the Netherlands, heightened anti-terrorism concerns may work in our favor. Although the Dutch broke up a PKK camp in 2004, the Turkish MFA continues to cite the Netherlands as insufficiently cooperative.

Turkey

ANKARA 00006164 003 OF 003

¶10. (C) The MFA will assemble an interagency group, allowing us both to get credit in the broader interagency community but also to try to identify specific actions that could move the process forward. Given the Turks' tendency to fall into a victim mindset and write off the European lack of cooperation as politically motivated, the team needs to keep hammering on what we call the "Al Capone" theme: i.e. going after the PKK with whatever works best. In other words, in addition to (difficult) extradition requests, Turkey should also try to develop leads to allow a local crimes to be prosecuted in western European countries. Anything the American team can bring in the way of specific ideas would be a big plus, as past meetings have tended to get stuck on in both sides repeating the same points. If they are available, the presence of one or more Legatts stationed in a western European capital would allow the Turks to hear from a U.S. law enforcement professional his or her on-the-ground assessment of how to elicit more effective cooperation and to establish relationships for trilateral working groups.

Broader Counterterrorism Dialogue

¶11. (C) The mere fact of the trip and the team's report on its efforts is a significant positive for the bilateral relationship, demonstrating USG support from our senior officials responsible for terrorism. Turkish MFA officials have been very appreciative of our efforts and tell us they

are seeing results from our efforts in western Europe. The U.S. effort in Europe is part and parcel of our broader effort against the PKK. The President expressed our commitment on this issue to Prime Minister Erdogan and the S/CT trip helps put flesh on the bones.

¶12. (C) While supportive of our efforts in Europe, however, be aware that the Turks see it as a complement to efforts in Iraq, and the Turks will not be receptive to a suggestion of a quid pro quo, beyond the broad point that strong Turkish cooperation against international terrorism strengthens their case on PKK. We understand the team will want to use the Ankara stop to raise broader counterterrorism cooperation issues, such as Turkey's failure to internationalize its definition of terrorism or its actions in support of designated terrorist financier Yasin al-Qadi. We would recommend discussing these issues in the small meeting with MFA Director General for Security Affairs Hayati Guven, rather than in the larger interagency session. The interagency group will consist of intelligence, law enforcement and judicial officials focused on the PKK. They may have no expertise on other counterterrorism issues and might misinterpret our raising them.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
<http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/>

WILSON